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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent,

I

vs.

Case No.
11313

CATHRYN PFANNENSTIEL,
)
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
Appeallant appeals from a denial of a Motion to
Quash the Information by the Honorable Charles G.
Cowley and Appellant's subsequent conviction.
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT
The appellant was charged with and convicted of
issuing a check against insufficient funds in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (Supp. 1967). Prior to
1

the finding of guilt by the Honorable Charles G.
Cowley, defendant made a motion to quash the Information on the grounds that the information did not
allege that a crime had been committed under the
statute. The motion was denied and defendant was
convicted under Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (Supp.
1967) from which defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the judgment of the
Second Judicial District Court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 14, 1967, the defendant, Cathryn E.
Pfannenstiel, wrote a check payable to the Ogden Tire
Center in the amount of $11.49 in payment for work
done on her car, for parts and servicing, by the Ogden
Tire Center. On July 19, 1967, the check was presented
to the Sunset Branch of the Clearfield State Bank for
payment. The bank refused to honor the check because
defendant did not have sufficient funds in her account
to cover the amount indicated on the check. (Tr. 10)
On August 1, 1967, the check was again presented for
payment and again the bank refused to pay the check
because of insufficient funds in appellant's account.
(Tr. 10)
A complaint was issued against the defendant and
a preliminary hearing was held November 30, 1967,
..,

..

resulting in defendant being bound over to the District
Court. 011 December 8, 1967, defendant was arraigned
on an information charging commission of a crime
under Utah Code Ann. S 76-20-11 (Supp. 1967) by
writing a check on her account without having sufficient funds ou deposit. Defendant filed a Motion to
Quash the Information on December 18, 1967, on the
grounds the defendant's acts did not constitute a crime
wider Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (Supp. 1967). The
motion was denied on January 26, Hl68. Defendant's
non-jury trial was held on April 18, 1968, before Honorable Charles G. Cowley and appellant was found guilty
as charged.
From the denial of the Motion to Quash and d~ fendant's subsequent conviction, the defendant appealr.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S ACT IS ONE CLEARLY A
CRil\IE 'VITHIN THE TERMS OF UTAH
CODE ANN.~ 76-20-11 (SUPP. 1967), UNDER
THE PLAIN l\IEANING OF THE STATUTE
/\.ND THE POLICY BEHIND IT.
Appellant claims that although she wrote a check
to pay for serYices performed on her car and that
although there was not enough money in her checking
account to pay the check when it was twice presented
for payment, tlie foct she did not recei\·e any cash in
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return for the check constitutes no crime under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (Supp. 1967.) 1 The state contends that her act is clearly within the prohibition of
the statute as intended by the Utah Legislature and
if appellant's argument is accepted, it would effectively
destroy the legislative intent and purpose for the law.
It seems clear that the intended scope of the statute
is to make illegal an act of a person whereby that person
makes a check and delivers it to another person purporting to pay the other for goods or services and the
act of making the check impliedly represents that there
is money in the bank upon which it is drawn, in the
account of the maker, sufficient to pay the amount of
the check. In the instant case, the appellant wrote and
issued a check to pay a bill for services performed upon
her car. The payment by check represented that she
had sufficient money in her account at the bank upon
which it was drawn to pay the amount of the check.
The fact that her account did not have enough money
to pay the check makes her act one prohibited by the
statute.

If appellant's interpretation of the statute were
accepted, that the meaning of the phrase "for the payment of money" as used in the statute means that a
1 The statutory provision reads in part a.s follows:.

.
Any person who for himself . . . w1llfully, with mtent to
defraud, makes or draws . . . any check . . . upon anY
bank for the payment of money, or wages. for labor performed, knowing at the time of such m~kmg . . . . t~at
the maker . . . has not sufficient funds m, or credit w1!h
said bank . . . for the paymen~ of s1:1ch checks . . . .. m
full upon its presentation
is pumshable by 1mpnson·
ment.
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person must receive cash in exchange for a bogus check,
then the effectiveness of the statute as a deterrent against
the making of bogus checks would be eviscerated and
the policy behind such statute completely ignored.
This court enunciated the policy behind the state
statute, prior to its amendment, in State v. Bruce, I
Utah 2d 136, 262 P .2d 960 ( 1953) , by stating:
The rapid concourse of modern business and
commerce requires the reliance upon many and
often far-flung credit transactions, from city to
city, across the nation and around the world. Its
free flow and equilibrium depend upon the use
of checks, drafts and other instruments evidencing debt and credit. The passing of worthless
instruments of credit, although done by a very
small minority, casts suspicion and doubt upon
the honest and trusting; such abuses are so disrupting that they cannot well be tolerated. We
agree with the thought aptly expressed by the
Supreme Court of Missouri, [State v. Taylor,
335 Mo. 460, 73 S.W.2d 378} that such conduct
"disarranges and retards. the business affairs of
every person and institution through whose hands
such a check passes to the bank upon which it is
drawn, and from which it returns by the same
route to the person to whom it was delivered
by the drawer. And this nuisance is so common,
insufferable, and injurious as to cause the state
to resort to 'the just exercise of its police power'
* * * to curb and prevent it.
Our legislature, by the bad check statute above
quoted, has attempted to eliminate such ann?yances by making them criminal and imposmg
penalties therefor. This purpose should not be
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defeated by an interpretation of the statute which
would perrnit one bent upon fraud to protect
hirnself . . . (Emphasis added.)

To adopt appellant's interpretation would be to
destroy the effectiveness of and the purpose for the
statute.
POINT II
UNDER THE PLAIN MEANING RULE
OF CONSTRUCTION AND CASE LA\V, THE
STATUTORY PHRASE "FOR THE PAYMENT OF MONEY" CAN ONLY BE DEFINED
TO MEAN "AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR OR THE
EQUIVALENT OF MONEY."
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11 (1968)
states, "~T ords and phrases are to be construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language ... " Referring to this statutory provision, the
state contends that the approved usage of the phrase
"for the payment of money" is that it means using a
check to pay for goods or services instead of or as a
substitute for cash. This court, while construing a
statute in an early case, said:
As before pointed out, the act is intended to
accomplish certain specific purposes; therefore
all of its prm·isionc.;, so far as consistent with the
rules of construction, must be construed and
applied in harmony with and in furtherance of
those purposes. United States Smeltinq, Rcfininy and Mfr!. Co. v. Utah Power and Liuht, 58
Utah 168, 197 Pac. 902 (1921).
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In this case, the statute's purpose is to prevent the
issuance of bogus checks. To interpret the phrase "for
the payment of money" as meaning using a check as a
substitute for money is an interpretation in harmony
with and furthers the purpose of the statute. The state
contends that under the plain meaning rule of construction, the only meaning that the phrase "for the
payment of money" could have is that a check is used
as a substitute for money as this interpretation is the
only one consistent with the intent in enacting the
statute and the policy behind it.
The interpretation of the statutory phrase "for the
payment of money" as meaning the equivalent or a
substitute for money finds support in the case law of
many states. The Kansas court, dealing with a statute 1
similar to Utah's in Foor v. State, 196 Kan. 618, 413
P.2d 719 (1966), where the appellant argued that the
statute did not apply to him since he received neither
money nor an automobile title in return for the check
be issued said, "the worthless check act does not concern
itself with whether or not the offender was able to keep
his ill-gotten gains." They said later in the opinion
that, "It is the altering, issuing, or delivering the check
for the payment of money or the equivalent that con2 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 20-554 (1963) reads in part as follows:
Any person who with intent to defraud, shall draw, make
. . . any check, order or draft on any bank or ~epository
for the payment of money or its equivalent, knowmg at the
time of the making, drawing . . . that the maker or drawer
has no deposit in or credits with such bank . . . or has
not sufficient funds in, or credit with such .bank . . . ~or
the payment of such check in full upon its presentation
shall be punished . . .
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stitutes the offense . . . The purpose of the act was
to stop the mischievous practice of overdraf ting and
"check-kiting" by the issuance of no fund checks
The offense was complete when the worthless check was
issued ... as a down payment on the automobile." In
State v. Avery, Ill Kan. 558, 207 Pac. 838 (1922), the
Kansas court said, ·'Under the statute of this state, the
offense does not consist in nonpayment of debt, but
in resorting to a practice which the legislature regarded
as demoralizing to business." In People v. Costello,
26 Cal.Rptr. 155 ( 1964), the court upheld the defendant's conviction for issuing bad checks in payment for
a refrigerator and checks as payment for gasoline and
auto repairs.
For other cases where the defendant was convicte<l
of issuing bogus checks for payment of goods or services
under statutes similar to Utah's see State v. Daymus,
90 Ariz .294, 367 P.2d 647 (1962); Ex Parte Myers,
119 Kan. 270, 237 Pac. 1026 ( 1925). In neither of
these cases did the defendant receive money in exchange
for the issued check.
Appellant claims that since a check is not money,
it is inconsistent to interpret the phrase "for the payment of money" as a substitute or equivalent of money.
Many courts, however, have stated that a check is, in
effect, used as an equivalent for the use of cash or money.
In Du Brzdz v. Bank of Visalia, 4 Cal. App. 201, 87
Pac. 467 ( 1906) , the court said, "A check on a bank,
if the drawer have money deposited therein to be checked
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out, is a demand on such bank for the payment of a
specific sum of money." In King v. Murphy, 151 N.Y.S.
467, 480 (1914), the New York Court, in deciding a
case in tort of fraud, said:
A check is intended to be representative of
cash. It is the business of the drawer to know
the state of his account with his bank and as to
whether through fraud or carelessness he makes
the representation that he has cash to meet it,
as he does by the act of drawing it ... that the
plaintiff was by reason of the implied representation that said check was good, was equivalent
to cash, that defendant would have funds in the
bank to meet it upon presentation . . . was induced thereby to part with the title and possession of cattle . . . (Emphasis added.)
In Tippman Packing Corp v. Rose, 120 N.Y.S.2d
461 ( 1953) , the court said, "The drawing and delivery
of a check is, in effect, a representation that there are
funds in the bank sufficient to meet the check on presentation and that it will be honored on presentation."
Citing Heuertmatte v. Morris, 101 N.Y. 63, 4 N.E.l;
King v. Murphy, supra. See also A. Sam and Sons Produce v. Campese, 217 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1961); State v.
Hammelsy, 52 Ore. 156, 96 Pac. 865 (1908); State v.
Wilson, 230 Ore. 251, 369 P.2d 739 (1962). As the
above cited cases point out, the common understanding
of what a check is by many courts is that it is the equivalent to or a substitute for money or cash. As such, the
phrase "for the payment of money" as used in our
statute does mean that a check is used as a substitute
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for money and therefore, as the facts in the present case
show, when a person makes a check knowing there are
not sufficient funds in the bank to pay it, and the check
is given for payment for goods or. services as a substitute
for money, such act is one prohibited by Utah's statute,
Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (Supp. 1967).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the state contends that the act of
appellant is clearly one prohibited by the Utah statute.
The phrase "for the payment of money" clearly means
the giving of a check as a substitute for money or the
entire intent and policy of the statute would be negated
and the effect of appellant's interpretation would be
to disrupt entirely commercial transactions within this
state making it almost impossible for a check to be used
in ordinary and daily business transactions. Here,
defendant, clearly guilty under the statute, is trying
to subvert the ends of justice by arguing a tenuous
technicality as a means of securing her freedom. This,
the State contends, should not be allowed to happen.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
C . .JEFFRY PAOLETTI
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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